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CLARIFYING THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD
IN THE INTERNET AGE
FOR CRIMES INVOLVING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Justin Kenyon+
An estimated fourteen million child pornography websites post up to 20,000
images of child pornography each week.1 However, the distribution of child
pornography had been nearly eliminated prior to “the advent of the Internet in
the early 1990s.”2 A main factor driving internet child pornography is the
“relative anonymity that the Internet affords to producers and consumers alike.”3
Equally appealing to distributors is the ease and low cost of the mass distribution
afforded by the Internet.”4 In response Congress has repeatedly enacted
legislation to aid in federal child pornography prosecutions.5 However, the
Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition has inhibited the
reach of federal prosecutors combating the crime of child pornography.6 It is
largely supported that “the rewards that may be reaped from a good forensic
investigation” of offenders’ computer devices is law enforcement’s most
effective tool towards eliminating the child pornography industry.7 Prosecutors
and police find gaining access to an offender’s computer as essential to the
successful child pornography prosecution.8 Establishing a sufficient basis of
probable cause to search a digital device has inhibited investigators due to the

+
Justin Kenyon is a Law Clerk to the Honorable Margaret M. Schweitzer, Circuit Court for
Montgomery County Maryland; J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law, 2020.
Thank you to Kevin Luibrand for supervising and guiding my development of this article. For their
diligent efforts, thank you to the Catholic University Law Review Editors. Last and most of all,
thank you to my parents John and Kathryn Kenyon, my siblings John, Courtney and Austin, and to
Erin Luibrand for their unwavering support.
1. Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of Internet Child
Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal Action, 11 APPALACHIAN J. L. 1–2 (2011).
2. Id. at 1.
3. Benjamin Vernia, Prosecuting Web-based Obscenity Cases, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE 1
(March
2004),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ceos/legacy/2012/03/19/
USABulletinMar2004.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Brian Slocum, The Aftermath of Free Speech: A New Definition for Child Pornography,
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE 8 (March 2004), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalceos/legacy/2012/03/19/USABulletinMar2004.pdf
6. Slocum, supra note 5.
7. James Fottrell, Making a Child Exploitation Case with Computer Forensics, U.S. DEP’T.
OF
JUSTICE
28
(March
2004),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalceos/legacy/2012/03/19/USABulletinMar2004.pdf.
8. Fotterell, supra note 7, at 29.
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changing nature of technology used by offenders.9 In determining probable
cause, some courts have considered evidence of attempted or prior child
molestation.10 This analysis has been based on courts considering the “intuitive
relationship” between prior child molestation and child pornography, an
assertion which was supported by scientific research.11 This connection between
the crimes of child pornography and child molestation has recently been
presented as a disputed consideration in probable cause determinations by the
courts, and its reconciliation is necessary.
In 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Falso found
that a warrant that included evidence of a prior conviction of child molestation
did not contribute to a finding of probable cause to form a basis to search the
defendant’s dwelling for child pornography.12 In his concurrence, Judge
Livingston warned that the “majority’s analysis is more likely to cloud than
clarify [our] understanding of Fourth Amendment issues in the difficult and
rapidly evolving context of internet searches.”13 True to those words, just two
years later the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Colbert14
found an “intuitive relationship between acts such as child molestation or
enticement and possession of child pornography.”15 In justifying the relevancy
of this connection to a probable cause determination, Colbert held that the
Second Circuit in Falso had failed to consider the recency of the child
molestation to the probable cause determination. Clarifying the Eighth Circuit’s
approach in how it distinguished Colbert from Falso is necessary to prevent any
confusion in the considerations needed in evaluating the connection between
prior child molestation and enticement offenses to determining probable cause
for a child pornography warrant in the future.
This comment will examine this issue by first following the developments in
our judicial system’s understanding of probable cause within the scope of recent
advancements in technology. This comment will also explore congressional
legislation and prior Supreme Court determinations that have changed how child
pornography offenders are prosecuted in the United States. This comment will
also examine the differing analysis that the Second and Eighth Circuit used to
reach their determinations, along with decisions from other circuits which
9. Fotterell, supra note 7, at 29.
10. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 2010).
11. Id. See Michael Seto, James Cantor & Ray Blanchard, Child Pornography Offenses are
a Valid Diagnostic Indicator of Pedophilia, 115 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 610, 613 (2006),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/6918923_Child_pornography_offenses_are_a
valid
diagnostic indicator of pedophilia (2006) (indicating that child pornography offenders were
significantly more likely to show a pedophilic pattern of sexual arousal).
12. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2nd Cir. 2008) (finding that while the warrant
lacked substantial basis for probable cause, evidence of child pornography seized in the search of
the defendant’s house was admissible under the Good Faith exception to the exclusionary rule).
13. Id. at 132 (Livingston, J., concurring).
14. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 577.
15. Id. at 578.
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support both holdings. Ultimately this comment will argue that the Eighth
Circuit’s categorical conclusion16 that the Second Circuit found the relationship
between child molestation and child pornography for the purpose of considering
probable cause to be irrelevant is improper. This comment will also posit that
the while the tendencies of the courts differ, the two circuits in fact are not in
opposition and an interpretation is present that reconciles both their holdings.
I. THE LONG AND CHANGING ROAD BEHIND THE PROBABLE CAUSE
STANDARD
A. Probable Cause Understood From Its Roots
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that “no [w]arrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”17 This clause requiring
a warrant is a hallmark of our democratic society since it “serves to interpose
between the police and an individual’s personal privacy an orderly procedure
involving a neutral and detached magistrate, who is responsible for making an
informed and deliberate determination on the issue of probable cause.”18 The
warrant clause protects the individual from arrests being made based upon
inferences drawn by law enforcement officers who often times engaged in the
“competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”19
In the two centuries since this liberty was secured, the Supreme Court has
analyzed probable cause in a variety of ways.20 In 1878, the Supreme Court in
Stacey v. Emery found that probable cause can only be satisfied “[i]f the facts
and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence
and caution in believing that the offence has been committed[.]”21 However, as
the years passed, the analysis for whether there was a sufficient basis for finding
probable cause took on different forms, such as the analysis in Aguilar v.
Texas.22 The Aguilar Court stressed the quality and reliability of the source of
the information which the affiant used to present their findings to the
magistrate.23 Ultimately the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for
illegal possession of heroin, holding that the affidavit “contain[ed] no

16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964); see also United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732,
739 (6th Cir. 2000).
19. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
20. 1–6 Search and Seizure § 6.09 (2017). See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)
(stating “the probable-cause standard is incapable of precise definition or quantification into
percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.”).
21. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
22. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 113.
23. Id.
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affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the
matters contained therein[.]”24
Less than twenty years later, the Court again reconsidered the standard in
Illinois v. Gates, where a search warrant was issued on the “basis of a partially
corroborated anonymous informant’s tip.”25 The Court stated that it agreed that
“an informant’s veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are all highly
relevant in determining the value of his report”; however, those elements should
not be “understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be
rigidly exacted in every case.”26 By breaking away from the Aguilar standard,
the Court found that:
[t]his totality-of-the- circumstances approach is far more consistent
with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand
that specific ‘tests’ be satisfied by every informant’s tip. Perhaps the
central teaching of our decisions bearing on the probable cause
standard is that it is a ‘practical, nontechnical conception’ … These
are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasons and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act.27
The Court’s opinion in Gates clarified that probable cause needed to be viewed
as a “fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules.”28 The standard of probable cause has molded to changes in our society
and our understanding of our privacy rights. However, at the advent of the
digital age the limit on how far the standard could be stretched was again tested.
B. Understanding the Probable Cause Standard in the Context of the Digital
Era
As the Internet rapidly became an everyday necessity, crimes such as the
transfer of digital child pornography frequently forced courts to question the
application of the probable cause standard when used by law enforcement to
search digital media.29 One of the new challenges faced by courts was to
“consider whether the warrant application must establish both that defendant is
likely to possess child pornography and that he is likely to use electronics to

24. Id. at 113–14.
25. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 217 (1983).
26. Id. at 230.
27. Id. at 230–31 (internal citations omitted).
28. Id. at 232. See Yale Kamisar, Gates, “Probable Cause,” “Good Faith,” and Beyond, 69
IOWA L. REV. 551, 552 (1984) (terming the test laid out in Gates as the “soft standard” in the
development of probable cause).
29. 1 PROSECUTOR’S MANUAL FOR ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 18.02(3)(b) (2018).
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obtain or store those images.”30 The courts have taken two views on what
amounts to probable cause for a search and seizure of digital devices.
1. The “Common-Sense” Approach to Establishing a Substantial Finding of
Probable Cause in Order to Search and Seize a Child Pornography
Offender’s Media Device
One approach courts have taken is to consider digital devices and internet
connections as “‘tools of the trade’ of a child molester and allow the seizure and
search of such items without any particularized knowledge about the
electronics.”31 Courts have justified this approach based on:
[T]he observation that images of child pornography are likely to be
hoarded by persons interested in those materials in the privacy of their
homes is supported by common sense … Because of their illegality
and the imprimatur of severe social stigma such images carry,
collectors will want to secret them in secure places, like a private
residence.32
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that it was a fair inference to
assume a defendant’s computer would contain child pornography based on
“[t]he presence of a computer with an internet hook-up and a Kinko’s receipt
indicating that [the defendant] had converted Polaroid photos into a digitalized
format.”33 This “common-sense” inferential approach has granted prosecutors
and law enforcement a substantial amount of power to search for evidence of
children pornography.34
2. A Narrower Approach to the Application of Establishing Probable Cause
to Search Digital Devices for Evidence of Child Pornography
Other court have taken a different approach when considering evidence which
establishes that the suspect possesses child pornography and that electronics are
used to store the contraband in their residence.35 The Second Circuit held that a
computer hard drive is similar to a residence, based on “the scope and quantity

30. Id. Among other factors, the court must also address whether any suspect with a
predilection for child pornography should be deemed likely to use such equipment, thereby
authorizing their seizure and search. Id.
31. Id. See United States v. Brackett, 846 F.3d 987, 992–94 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding that a
search warrant granting law enforcement to search all of the defendant’s digital devices that had
the ability to store images was valid based on information that the defendant had sex with a minor,
took nude photos, and had a prior conviction videotaping sexual acts performed by a minor).
32. 1 PROSECUTOR’S MANUAL FOR ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 18.02(3)(b) (2018).
See United States v. McArthur, 573 F.3d 608, 613–14 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 861 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Lamb, 945 F. Supp. 441,
460 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)).
33. Ricardi, 405 F.3d at 860.
34. Id. at 860–61.
35. 1 PROSECUTOR’S MANUAL FOR ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 18.02(3)(b) (2018).
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of private information it may contain.”36 Due to this relatively new ability to
store immense amounts of private information, computer searches logically
involve “much more intrusiveness than searches of other containers,” meaning
the potential for privacy violations is enormous.37 As an example, if the
Government obtains a warrant to search a hard drive, it thereby has the authority
to examine the contents of every file it chooses to open.38
By focusing on the suspect’s connection to digital media, Circuit courts have
distinguished themselves from the “common-sense” application for finding
probable cause for child pornography crimes. In Chism v. Washington, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that probable cause could not be established
when the only evidence supporting probable cause that the defendant possessed
child pornography was that his credit card had been charged three times from
websites that contained child pornographic images.39 The Ninth Circuit applied
a “fair probability test,” which had been first identified in United States v.
Gourde.40 This test required that the affidavit to show “(1) that a crime was
committed; (2) that it was [the defendant] who committed the crime; (3) that
evidence of the crime would be found in the place to be searched.”41 The Sixth
Circuit stated that a “sufficient nexus between the location to be searched and
the evidence sought” is required to establish probable cause that this type of
crime has been committed.42
This narrower approach places greater emphasis on producing evidence for
the warrant that the crime was committed and that the defendant’s electronic
devices were used to store the contraband. Regardless of which approach is
applied, all courts have considered the strong government interest in preventing
the distribution of child pornography and effectively prosecuting offenders.43
36. 5 COMPUTER LAW § 21.03(8)(O) (2018).
37. Id. “[B]ecause files containing evidence may be intermingled with many innocuous files,
efforts to locate particular files require examining many others.” Id.
38. Id.
39. Chism v. Washington, 661 F.3d 380, 389–90 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that “this connection
is a far cry from the facts presented in the affidavit which stated [the defendant] ‘downloaded’ and
‘purchase[d]’ child pornography.”).
40. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069–71 (9th Cir. 2006).
41. Chism, 661 F.3d at 389. See Gourde, 440 F.3d 1070–71 (finding the evidence sufficient
to establish probable cause to believe [the defendant’s] computer contained images of child
pornography when (1) that the accessed website was a child pornography site “whose primary
content was in the form of images;” (2) that a subscriber to the website, “[the defendant] had access
and wanted access to these illegal images;” and (3) that “having paid for multi-month access to a
child pornography site,” and owning to the “long memory of computers” [the defendant’s]
computer was likely to contain evidence of the crime.”).
42. United States v. Wagers, 452 F.3d 534, 540 (6th Cir. 2006). Here the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the nexus between an AOL email account and child pornography accessed
through the Internet, where it was accessed through AOL IP addresses is sufficient to establish
probable cause. Id. at 540–41.
43. Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of Internet Child
Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal Action, 11 APPALACHIAN J. L. 1, 13 (2011).
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For this reason, it is necessary to examine the measures taken by legislatures to
combat this crime.
II. COMBATING THE SPREAD OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY: THE CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE TO THE RAPID INFLUX IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENDERS
A. Early Successes in Preventing the Spread of Child Pornography
Until the mid-to-late 1970s, attitudes towards child pornography were
relatively relaxed, and as a result laws prohibiting this industry did not exist.44
In response to growing public concern, Congress passed the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which prohibited “the
manufacture or commercial distribution of obscene materials involving children
sixteen years or younger.”45 At this time state legislatures who had passed
similar laws came under attack in the courts on the grounds that the application
of the legislation to individual circumstances violated the First Amendment.46
In the landmark case of New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court developed the
constitutional foundation for criminalizing child pornography, by (1) finding
that obscenity, as understood in Miller v. California,47 is not protected speech;
and (2) holding that states are permitted to criminalize child pornography, as it
“constitutes a government objective of surpassing importance.”48
44. Henzey, supra note 1, at 11. Between 1976 and 1977, however, public opinion on the
relaxed attitudes shifted due largely in part by feminist groups and decency campaigners who
utilized media outlets such as the NBC Television News. Id. at 11–12.
45. Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 95 Pub. L. 225, 92 Stat.
7 (1978). See also Henzey, supra note 1, at 12. This Act was credited for “eliminating the open
trade of child pornography at the time.” Id.
46. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 753 (1982).
47. In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court discussed the basic guidelines for what material
is considered obscene. Those include:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
48. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 754, 757. This holding was based on five determinations made by
the court.
First. It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in ‘safeguarding
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling’ .… Second. The
distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is
intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in at least two ways. First, the
materials produced are a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm
to the child is exacerbated by their circulation. Second, the distribution network for child
pornography must be closed if the production of material which requires the sexual
exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled .… Third. The advertising and
selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for and are thus an integral part
of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation .… Fourth.
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Over the next decade, Congress passed multiple other federal pornography
laws “which virtually removed all First Amendment protection from the entire
category of child pornography by automatically deeming any representation of
sex involving a minor as obscene and thus illegal.”49 By the mid-1990s,
Congress passed the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA)50 in
response to “high-tech kiddie porn,” pornographic images of children created,
altered, recorded, reproduced or distributed using new technologies, especially
computers.51 Subsequently the definition of child pornography was expanded
to include any “computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced
by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexual explicit conduct ....”52 The
congressional intent behind this act was “to close a loophole in our Federal child
pornography laws caused by advances in computer technology.”53 This
advancement in the battle against child pornography soon came under attack
when reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in Ashcroft.54

The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children
engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis .… Fifth.
Recognizing and classifying child pornography as a category of material outside the
protection of the Frist Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier decisions.
Id. at 756–63.
49. Henzey, supra note 1, at 14; see The Child Protection Act of 1984, 98 Pub. L. 292, 98
Stat. 204 (1984); The Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, 99 Pub. L. 628, 100 Stat.
3510 (1986); The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act, 100 Pub. L. 690, 102 Stat.
4485 (1988); The Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act, 101 Pub. L. 647,
104 Stat. 2816 (1990).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. V 1999).
51. S. REP. NO. 104–358, at 7 (1996).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000) (later amended). The full definition provided by the CPPA
includes:
Any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an
identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in
such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual
depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct ....
Id.
53. S. REP. NO. 104–358, at 28 (1996). See also Sarah Sternberg, The Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 and the First Amendment: Virtual Antitheses, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2783,
2797 (2001).
54. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239 (2002).
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B. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition and a Clearer Definition of Child
Pornography in its Aftermath
In Ashcroft, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining the
constitutionality of the CPPA and its prohibition against any images of computer
generated children.55 The statute had extended beyond the holding in Ferber
which prohibited child pornography “because of the State’s interest in protecting
the children exploited by the production process.”56 The respondents included
“a California trade association for the adult entertainment industry … the
publisher of a book advocating the nudist lifestyle … a painter of nudes … [and]
a photographer specializing in erotic images.”57 All of these individuals argued
that while “they did not use minors in their sexually explicit works,” their work
had a chance of falling into the CPPA’s expanded definition of child
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B).58
While the Court acknowledged that “the sexual abuse of a child is a most
serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people,” it
concluded that the possibility of the crime being committed “by itself does not
justify laws suppressing protected speech.”59 The Court stated that unlike the
speech prohibited in Ferber, “the CPPA prohibits speech that records no crime
and creates no victims by its production. Virtual child pornography is not
‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse of children…”60 In response to the
Government’s argument that virtual child pornography encourages pedophiles
to participate in illegal conduct such as child molestation, the Court found that
“the mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts in not a sufficient
reason for banning it.”61 The Court held that the statutory language of the CPPA

55. Id.
56. Id. at 240. This prohibition itself extended beyond the Miller standard, which prohibited
obscene images since that test did not “reflect the State’s particular and more compelling interest
in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children.” Id. See Osborne v. Ohio,
495 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1990) (finding that the court was justified in passing legislation against all
forms of child pornography since their purpose was to “stamp out this vice at all levels in the
distribution chain.”).
57. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 243.
58. Id. Respondents contended that their work would be subject to the “appears to be
provision.” Id. Furthermore, they argued that
[t]he statute is not so limited in its reach, however, as it punishes even those possessors
who took no part in pandering. Once a work has been described as child pornography,
the taint remains on the speech in the hands of subsequent possessors, making possession
unlawful even though the content otherwise would not be objectionable.
Id. at 242–43.
59. Id. at 244–45.
60. Id. at 250. The Court rejects the Government’s argument that virtual images can lead to
actual instances of child abuse since “the harm does not necessarily follow from the speech…” Id.
61. Id.
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was overbroad as the respondents had initially contended,62 and the prohibitions
of § 2256(8)(B) and § 2256(8)(D) were ruled unconstitutional.63
The Court’s decision in Ashcroft was sweeping and had a drastic impact on
the Government’s prosecutorial abilities to combat the crime of child
pornography.64 In the aftermath of the decision, defendants charged with
possession of child pornography routinely “contend[ed] that there is a
‘reasonable doubt’ as to whether charged images, particularly digital images on
a computer, were produced with an actual child, or as a result of some other
process.”65 This presented a problem for prosecutors because without a statutory
provision that included realistic digital images, it was challenging to satisfy the
burden of proof in cases of real but unidentified minors.66 In cases where the
minor would be identified, the Government suffered from a lack of resources
and manpower while arranging for law enforcement agents who had been in
contact with the child to testify in their trial.67 All of these factors, along with
the strong criticism68 the Court received, prompted a definitive legislative
response.69
On April 30, 2003, Congress enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (“PROTECT
Act”).70 Congress amended § 2256(8)(B) to read, “such visual depiction is a
digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is
indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit

62. Id. at 258. The Court cites examples of what could fall under the CPPA, including “a
picture in a psychology manual, as well as a movie depicting the horrors of sexual abuse.” Id. at
246.
63. Id. at 258.
64. Brian Slocum, The Aftermath of Free Speech: A New Definition for Child Pornography,
52 U.S. ATTY’S BULLETIN 8 (March 2004), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalceos/legacy/2012/03/19/USABulletinMar2004.pdf.
65. Id.
66. Id. This pattern grew progressively worse as trials involved experts on both sides “arguing
over the method of generating images that look like, and probably are real children.” Id.
67. Id.
68. Henzey, supra note 1, at 22. Attorney General John Ashcroft criticized the Court’s ruling,
stating, “the United States Supreme Court has made our ability to prosecute those who produce and
possess child pornography immeasurably more difficult.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Ernest
Allen, President of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Child (NCMEC), stated:
In our judgment, we think it’s devastating for America’s children. The probable impact
is a proliferation of child pornography, unlike anything we have seen in this country for
the past 20 years. We believe that it’s also going to mean that thousands of children are
going to be sexually victimized. Since determining the identity of children in child
pornography is very difficult, often times impossible, the requirement that a specific child
be identified will result in thousands of prosecutions not happening.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
69. Slocum, supra note 64 at 8.
70. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108–21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
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conduct[.]”71 Congress added the phrase “indistinguishable from” to remedy the
“appears to be” standard which the United States Supreme Court had found
unconstitutionally overbroad.72 The legislature defined this more narrowly
tailored replacement language as “virtually indistinguishable, in that the
depiction is such that an ordinary person viewing the depiction would conclude
that the depiction is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”73
Given its concern for growing trends in the child pornography industry,
Congress acted hastily.74 Congress concluded that “[t]here is no evidence that
the future development of easy and inexpensive means of computer generating
realistic images of children would stop or even reduce the sexual abuse of real
children or the practice of visually recording the abuse.”75 Furthermore, they
discovered that “in the absence of congressional action [prohibiting virtual child
pornography], the difficulties in enforcing the child pornography laws will
continue to grow increasingly worse.”76 To prevent what Congress termed as a
“grave threat,” it concluded that an amendment must be made to the statute to
prohibit the subcategory of virtual images from being trafficked or possessed.77
The amendment provided through the PROTECT Act was crafted to address the
Supreme Court’s concern in Ashcroft and it was therefore narrowly tailored to
advance the government’s compelling interest without casting a broad net over
protected speech.78
III. ANALYSIS
The PROTECT Act was intended to provide clarification for the courts and
law enforcement on what constituted child pornography in the digital era, but
this did not cure the challenges in determining how to meet the probable cause
71. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2012) (emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(11).
74. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108–21, 117 Stat. 650, § 501(14–15).
75. Id. at § 501(12).
76. Id. at § 501(13). This was based on the understanding that since the “technology exists
to create composite or computer-generated depictions that are indistinguishable from depictions of
real children [this] will allow defendants who possess images of real children to escape prosecution;
for it threatens to create a reasonable doubt in every case of computer images even when a real
child was abused.” Id.
77. Id. at § 501(14–15).
78. Brian Slocum, The Aftermath of Free Speech: A New Definition for Child Pornography,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 9 (March 2004), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalceos/legacy/2012/03/19/USABulletinMar2004.pdf. The Act was narrowly tailored in four ways:
First, the proscription of virtual images is limited to digital, computer or computergenerated images. Second, the image must genuinely look like they depict real children.
Third the sexual content must be particularly explicit. Fourth the defendant can escape
conviction through an affirmative defense by establishing that the images were produced
without the use of real children.
Id.
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standard. This set the framework for the perceived circuit split in Colbert, where
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished its case from the Second
Circuit in Falso, a holding which rejected any relationship between the
possession of child pornography and other forms of sexual abuse of children.79
A. Getting to Falso: How the Second Circuit Had Ruled on Prior Child
Pornography Cases Involving Digital Media
Falso presented the Second Circuit with a unique situation that the court had
not considered in its 2005 opinions United States v. Martin and United States v.
Coreas.80 Nonetheless, both of these opinions, which were handed down within
two weeks of each other, were relied upon heavily in the court’s analysis in
Falso.81
In Martin, the Second Circuit considered the sufficiency of an affidavit
provided to a magistrate for the purpose of searching his residence, which had
been based on information gathered in the FBI investigation known as
“Operation Candyman.”82 After the warrant had been issued, it was argued that
the supporting affidavit “contain[ed] misstatements about general investigative
facts.”83 However, Martin moved, unsuccessfully, to suppress the evidence
obtained by federal investigators.84 The Circuit majority affirmed the Eastern
District of New York court’s ruling and stated “[i]t is common sense that an
individual who joins such a site would more than likely download and possess
such material.”85 The court held that this conclusion “does not grant the
79. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 2010).
80. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 113–14 (2nd Cir. 2008).
81. Id. at 116–21.
82. United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 73–77 (2d Cir. 2005). Operation Candyman was a
national operation conducted by the FBI conducted to investigate individuals that had been
suspected of collecting and distributing child pornography over the internet. Id. at 69. The searches
conducted “were pursuant to warrants supported by affidavits, each of which recounted the same
investigative findings by the same FBI agent but contained additional facts specific to the particular
search.” Id.
83. Id. at 69.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 75. The following factors were considered when determining the sufficiency of the
affidavit in establishing probable cause:
First, the girls 12–16’s welcome message unabashedly announced that its essential
purpose was to trade child pornography .… Second the affidavit contained an extensive
background discussion of the ‘modus operandi’ of those who use computers for
collecting and distributing child pornography, include their reliance on e-groups, e-mail,
bulletin boards, file transfers, and online storage …. Third [the affidavit] described the
characteristics and proclivities of child pornography collectors, specifically how they
tend to collect such material, store it, and rarely destroy or discard it …. Fourth, girls
12–16’s illicit purpose could be inferred from the website’s technological features (files,
messages, polls, e-mail, links, polls, chat and membership lists) and facilitated the trading
of child pornography …. Fifth, the agent confirmed that the material uploaded and
downloaded on the girls 12–16 site included child pornography and child erotica, and
that this material was available to all members .… Sixth, the affidavit established a nexus
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government an unchecked license to search citizens’ homes simply because they
are members of an offensive or disreputable group,” but rather the analysis was
based on the “totality of the evidence proffered in the affidavit” and there was
“a substantial likelihood” of the crime having been committed.86
Judge Pooler dissented, stating that the majority in Martin had established “a
dangerous precedent.”87 Judge Pooler warned that this holding now supported
the theory that the government could obtain a warrant to search a home based
on evidence of an individual subscribing to an e-group that has an illegal
purpose, regardless of there being any evidence of the individual participating
in the e-group’s function.88
Two weeks later, the Second Circuit in Coreas faced the same question it had
answered in Martin, but expressed the opposite view.89 During Operation
Candyman, another e-group known as “Candyman” was discovered “that
allowed its members to exchange information, upload and download electronic
files, and chat with other members in ‘real time.’”90 Using the same affidavit
filed in Martin, which contained false information, FBI agents convinced a
magistrate that there was probable cause, resulting in the search of Coreas’
residence where investigators discovered over one hundred images of child
pornography on his computer.91
On appeal, the Second Circuit referenced Judge Pooler’s Martin dissent,
specifically that “it [is] well settled that a ‘person’s mere propinquity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to
probable cause to search that person.”92 The Circuit held that “by this act of
clicking a button, he provided probable cause for the police to enter his private
between the member and the website: The girls 12–16 member who utilized the e-mail
address (omitted) lived at the searched house …. Seventh, (email omitted) joined girls
12–16 voluntarily and never cancelled his membership.
Id.
86. Id. at 76.
87. Id. at 78.
88. Id. Judge Pooler believed the inferences established by the majority were unreasonable
due to the deficiencies presented in the corrected affidavit. Id. at 79. Those included:
First the corrected affidavit does not allege facts that support an inference that Martin
participated in any of the E-group’s legal or illegal functions. Second the corrected
affidavit doesn’t not support the conclusion that the overriding purpose of the E-group
was illegal. Third the corrected affidavit’s allegation that Martin was an E-group
subscriber indicates only Martin’s propinquity to other who were committing a crime,
which is not sufficient to establish probable cause. Fourth the corrected affidavit’s
allegations regarding the propensities of “collectors of child pornography” do little to
establish probable cause with respect to Martin.
Id.
89. United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151, 159 (2d Cir. 2005).
90. Id. at 152.
91. Id. at 154.
92. Id. at 156 (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)). See also United States v.
Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2005).
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dwelling and rummage through various of his personal effects seems utterly
repellent to core purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”93 The Court in Coreas
determined that the claim that members of Candyman automatically received
emails containing child pornography was a reckless disregard of the truth.94
Without this support in the corrected affidavit, the Circuit ruled that simply
logging on to a website and accepting the introduction message did not suffice
to show that Coreas would likely have possessed child pornography.95 Aiding
the court in drawing this conclusion was the lack of evidence that the e-group
Candyman’s sole purpose was to collect and distribute child pornography, which
made it distinguishable from the e-group in Martin.96 The Circuit held that
“requiring particularized information to be gathered before the warrant
application is made will simply focus law enforcement efforts on those who can
reasonably be suspected of receiving child pornography.”97
These contrasting viewpoints show that the principal factor that separated the
analyses in Martin and Coreas was the specific information contained in the
affidavit submitted. This factor is imperative leading up to the Second Circuit’s
decision in Falso.
B. Falso: A New Challenge for the Second Circuit
In June 2005, David J. Falso became the subject of an FBI investigation for
his possible links to an e-group involved with the sharing of child pornography.98
The investigation was handled by FBI Agent James Lyons, and the application
for a warrant to search Falso’s dwelling was supported by a twenty-six-page
affidavit.99 Within the affidavit, Agent Lyons provided generalized information:
individuals who exploit children, including collectors of child
pornography, commonly use computers to: communicate with likeminded individuals, store their child pornography collections, and
locate, view, download, collect and organize images of child
pornography found on the internet … [C]ollectors and distributors of
child pornography sometimes use online resources to retrieve and
store child pornography, including services offered by internet portals
such as Yahoo! Inc.100
93. Coreas, 419 F.3d at 156.
94. Id. at 155–56.
95. Id. at 156.
96. Id. at 157. This judicial conclusion was found based on evidence included in the affidavit
regarding the welcome message that all users on Candyman received. Id. Phrases from the
welcome message, such as “post any type of message you would like,” were considered when
determining that the sole purpose of Candyman may not have been the distribution of child
pornography. Id.
97. Id. at 158.
98. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Additional information was included, such as observations from the FBI
Behavioral Analysis Unit that “the majority of individuals who collect child
pornography are persons who have a sexual attraction to children, and that those
who collect images of child pornography generally store their collections at
home.”101
Essential to the validity of Agent Lyons’ affidavit was the suggestion that
Falso was involved with a website, www.cpfreedom.com, which contained
“approximately eleven images of child pornography.”102 The affidavit provided
that this assertion was based on a forensic investigation of www.cpfreedom.com,
revealing “several possible subscribers along with e-mail addresses” which
included a Yahoo account and email address associated with Falso.103 Based on
this forensic examination, the affidavit stated that “it appear[ed] that Falso
‘either gained access or attempted to gain access to the [non-member]
website.”104
Moreover, within the affidavit Agent Lyons included that on February 18,
1987, about eighteen years prior to the investigation, “Falso was arrested by the
New York State Police for sexually abusing a seven-year old girl and was
charged with Sexual Abuse and Endangering the Welfare of a Child.”105 Agent
Lyons’ affidavit was presented to the magistrate and a search warrant was
granted on June 1, 2005.106
The warrant was executed on June 8, 2005, and the search revealed images of
child pornography both in his bedroom and on his computer.107 Falso moved to
suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing that the law enforcement
agents had not established a sufficient basis for probable cause, specifically
claiming that there was a lack of evidence showing he was “a member or
subscriber to the website, or that the overriding purpose of the website was the
trading of child pornography.108 On February 24, 2006, the district court denied
101. Id.
102. Id. at 113–14. This website, which “contained approximately eleven images of child
pornography,” also advertised additional contraband for a $99 one-month membership fee. Id.
103. Id. at 114. (The court finding “[r]ecords obtained from Yahoo indicated that Falso had
an active Yahoo account, with the log in name of “cousy1731” and the Yahoo email address.”).
Records from Yahoo.com indicated that the account was associated with Falso’s residential address
and it had been active “during the period of time immediately preceding the warrant request.” Id.
104. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal punctuation omitted).
105. Id. Details from the police report were also included in the affidavit and stated that “Falso
placed his hands inside the girl’s underwear and digitally penetrated her and acknowledged to
police that he may need counseling for latent problems.” Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. During the search, Falso “admitted to, among other things, obtaining child
pornography from the internet; engaging in sexual activity with females in other countries whom
he believed to be between the ages of sixteen and eighteen; and having been convicted for sexually
abusing a seven-year old girl.” Id.
108. Id. at 115. The defendant “submitted an affidavit from a data forensic expert …
explain[ing] that, ‘there is a difference between visiting a website and becom[ing] a member and/or
subscriber to the site.’” Id.
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Falso’s motions, finding that probable cause existed.109 Moreover, the court
found that Falso’s prior sexual contact with a minor was “highly relevant to the
criminal activity at issue here.”110 After his motions were denied, Falso pled
guilty to all 242 counts in the indictment.111
On appeal of the probable cause finding, the Second Circuit faced the question
of whether probable cause could be found based on evidence in an affidavit
stating 1) Falso had “appeared to have gained or attempted to gain access” to a
website that contained child pornography and 2) he “had been convicted 18 years
earlier of a misdemeanor based on sexual abuse of a minor.”112 The court first
analyzed the evidence suggesting that Falso had accessed the website involved
in the investigation, and it was within this context that it reviewed both Martin
and Coreas.113 The Court concluded that the evidence provided in the affidavit
distinguished Martin and Coreas from being controlling, finding that Agent
Lyons affidavit only provided evidence that Falso “appeared to have gained or
attempted to gain access,” rejecting the district court’s ruling that it supported
its finding of probable cause.114
The other substantial factor the district court attributed to the finding of
probable cause was the affidavit referencing Falso’s eighteen-year-old
misdemeanor charge, which stated “the majority of individuals who collect child
pornography are persons who have a sexual attraction to children.”115 The court
disagreed with the factual analysis by the lower court, finding instead that “the

109. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 115–16 (2d Cir. 2008). The Court went on to state
five inferences which they believed established probable cause:
First, there was the information concerning the background of persons dealing in child
pornography, including the fact that persons who collect child pornography have a sexual
attraction to children. Second, there was information that the web site, CP Freedom,
advertised that it contained child pornography, actually had some images of child
pornography available on it free of charge and advertised that it had additional images of
child pornography upon payment of a fee. Third, the FBI determined that the material
associated with the website is hardcore child pornography. Fourth, there was evidence
that [Falso] had access or attempted to access the CP Freedom web site. Fifth, there was
information [that Falso] actually engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with a minor in
the past.
Id. at 116.
110. Id. In addition to finding that probable cause existed, the court also stated that “even if
there had been an insufficient basis for finding probable cause, suppression of the evidence was not
warranted because of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied.” Id. at 117.
111. Id. at 117.
112. Id. at 110.
113. Id. at 117–20.
114. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 113, 120–21 (internal punctuation omitted). By
distinguishing this case from Martin and Coreas, the court asserted that the ultimate inference
drawn there, that “membership in the e-group reasonable implied use of the website” and that it
was “common sense that an individual who joins such a site would more than likely download and
possess such material,” could not be established here. Id. at 121 (internal citations omitted).
115. Id. at 121–22.
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association is nowhere stated or supported in the affidavit.”116 Further, the court
reiterated Judge Pooler’s dissent in Martin, finding that “[i]t is an inferential
fallacy of ancient standing to conclude that, because members of group A (those
who collect child pornography) are likely to be members of group B (those
attracted to children), then group B is entirely, or even largely composed of
members of group A.”117 While the court did not deny that the offenses relating
to child pornography and the sexual abuse of a minor both involve the
exploitation of children, this fact did not support the probable cause correlation
found by the lower court.118 Concluding that little weight should be given to the
prior conviction, the court also ruled that any support found by the district court
in the generalized allegations included within the affidavit “fail to establish the
requisite nexus of illegal activity to Falso.”119 The court rejected the district
court’s finding of probable cause, but affirmed the judgment due to the separate
finding of a good-faith exception.120
Falso presented the Second Circuit with a new challenge, which required the
consideration of whether prior acts of sexual abuse of children was relevant to
the probable cause analysis for the crime of child pornography. Just two years
later, the Eighth Circuit in Colbert rejected the Falso conclusion, further
obscuring what was already a difficult issue in the realm of child pornography.
C. Colbert: A Harsh Take on the Analysis in Falso
The events of Colbert occurred one year after the investigation of Falso was
conducted. On June 7, 2006 detectives in Davenport, Iowa were called to
investigate after suspicious activity involving a young child had been
reported.121 Upon their arrival, the investigators were informed that a man had
been observed pushing a five-year-old girl on the swings and talking to her
“about movies and videos the man had at his home.”122 Colbert was later

116. Id.
117. Id. (internal punctuation and citations omitted).
118. Id. In support of this contention, the court provides an analogy, stating “it may be state
that most people who sell drugs do drugs. That is not to say, however, that most people who do
drugs sell drugs.” Id. at n.15.
119. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124. The generalized allegations rejected by the
court included: “(1) the propensity of collectors of child pornography to intentionally maintain
illegal images; (2) law enforcement’s ability to retrieve such images from a computer; and (3) the
ability to view child pornography on the cpfreedom.com website.” Id.
120. Id. at 129 (finding that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement applied since
the district court had not been knowingly or recklessly mislead and the affidavit was not so lacking
in indicia of probable cause).
121. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 575 (8th Cir. 2010). Investigators were called to
Vandeveer Park, in Davenport where they found the child with her uncle. Id.
122. Id. The detectives had gathered this knowledge from the child herself and two other
witnesses, one being the child’s uncle. Id.
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stopped in his vehicle, and consented to a search of his car.123 Due to the nature
of the complaint and the unusual items found in Colbert’s car, he was taken to
the police station for questioning while law enforcement agents began drafting
a warrant seeking “permission to search Colbert’s residence for books, photos,
videos, and other electronic media depicting ‘minors engaged in a prohibited
sexual act or in the simulation of a prohibited sexual act.’”124 A judge issued a
search warrant after reviewing the affidavit which included the facts presented
above, along with the assertion that Colbert had “attempted to lure a five-yearold female to go to his apartment.”125
The search revealed multiple compact disks containing child pornography
which Colbert moved to suppress at trial on the basis that 1) the affidavit “was
conclusory in nature, failing to specify the source of the information that it
contained” and 2) that there was insufficient evidence presented to show a nexus
between the alleged enticement and child pornography which would be found at
his home.126 The district court denied his motion and Colbert plead guilty to
possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).127
On the first issue in his appeal, the court cited Gates, in which the Supreme
Court found that law enforcement affidavits “stated that they believed or had a
credible reason to believe that a search would yield evidence of criminal
conduct” were prohibited under the Fourth Amendment.128 The court found that
while the affidavit was not “a model of detailed police work,” it nonetheless
presented a fair inference that the source of information came from the police

123. Id. Colbert’s vehicle resembled a police cruiser, due to its blue color and being equipped
with rear antennas. Id.
124. Id. During the search of his vehicle, the police discovered “a police scanner, handcuffs
and a hat bearing the phrase ‘New York PD’.” Id. Colbert admitted to speaking with the minor
however he claimed his car contained those items because he had previously worked as a security
guard. Id.
125. Id. at 575–76.
126. Id. at 576–77.
127. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 575 (8th Cir. 2010). 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)
states
Any person who … either … knowingly possesses, or knowingly accesses with intent to
view, 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which
contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported
using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which have been mailed or
so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if—
(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished as provided in subsection
(b) of this section.
§ 2252.
128. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 576. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (finding that an
affidavit that is wholly conclusory does not satisfy the probable cause standard).
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officers based on the drafters “firsthand knowledge of the investigation.”129 As
a result, the court rejected Colbert’s assertion that the affidavit’s conclusory
nature prohibited a finding of probable cause.130
Next, the court turned to the predominant issue of whether the affidavit had
established a sufficient link between evidence of enticement and the contraband
located at Colbert’s home. As for proof of the alleged enticement, the court drew
the following inferences from the evidence provided in the affidavit: 1) the
clothing found in his car show that Colbert was “attempting to appear as an
authority figure,” 2) the handcuffs and binoculars “give rise to the inference that
he was surveilling the area,” 3) that these factors, in conjunction with Colbert
approaching the minor and speaking with her for almost an hour about movies
he had at his home, “tend to paint a picture of an older man attempting to entice
a young girl into sexual activity.”131
With these inferences drawn, the court agreed with the district court, which
had found probable cause “because individuals sexually interested in children
frequently utilize child pornography to reduce the inhibitions of their victims”
and “sexual depictions of minors could be logically related to the crime of child
enticement.”132 Building upon what the district court had stated, the Eighth
Circuit ruled that “[t]here is an intuitive relationship between acts such as child
molestation or enticement and possession of child pornography.”133 The court
found support in the Supreme Court statements in Osborne v. Ohio where it was
held that “evidence suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce
other children into sexual activity.”134
Colbert distinguished itself from Falso, finding that the two cases were both
factually and legally inapposite.135 The court emphasized the immediacy of the
potential enticement in Colbert.136 Whereas in Falso, evidence provided in the
affidavit about the sexual abuse of a minor was almost two decades old, here the

129. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 576.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 577.
132. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2010).
133. Id. at 578. See United States v. Paton, 535 F.3d 829, 836 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that
computer and the internet can be considered “tools of the … trade” for individuals who have
pedophilic tendencies); United States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329, 1339 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that it
is “common sense” to assume individuals who are sexually attracted to children “order and receive
child pornography.”).
134. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578 (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (finding an
Ohio statute which prohibited possession or viewing of child pornography constitutional due to the
state’s compelling interest in safeguarding minors)).
135. Colbert, at 577–78. The court also distinguishes itself from the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in United States v. Hodson, where that court overturned a lower court’s finding of probable
cause due to the affidavit presenting probable cause for child molestation but its purpose was to
search for evidence of child pornography, “an entirely different crime.” Id. at 577. See also United
States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 292 (6th Cir. 2008).
136. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578.

652

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 69.3:1

threat of enticement occurred on the very same day the warrant was executed.137
The Colbert court contrasted its facts to Falso since there the search did not
include the place of the relevant sex crime, while law enforcement agents in
Colbert “focused their search on the very place where Colbert had expressed a
desire to be alone with a five-year-old girl.”138
The Colbert court further distinguished itself from Falso by asserting that the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals found the defendant’s propensity to sexually
abuse children was irrelevant to their probable cause analysis, finding that the
Second Circuit “based their conclusions on a categorical distinction between
possession of child pornography and other types of sexual exploitation of
children.”139
While the factual distinctions are readily apparent, the sharp contrast asserted
in Colbert between the Second and Eighth Circuits in regard to Fourth
Amendment purposes for establishing probable cause poses the risk of creating
unnecessary confusion within the scope of child pornography. This risk is
arguably unfounded however due to the Eighth Circuit’s misunderstanding of
the Second Circuit’s analysis in Falso.
IV. CLEARING THE AIR: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT’S MISCONCEPTION REGARDING
THE PROBABLE CAUSE ANALYSIS IN FALSO
Based on a thorough review of Falso and Colbert, it is clear that the court in
Colbert was simply wrong in concluding that the court in Falso failed to
consider the relationship between the evidence of prior sexual abuse of a child
in the probable cause analysis. This is a contention that requires reconciliation
to avoid any additional confusion sister circuits may have in an area of law that
is already fraught with misperceptions.
The Falso court approached the question of whether probable cause was
sufficiently established in two separate sections.140 This was purposely done
because the court had determined that the district court’s evaluation rested on
two important and separate assertions in the affidavit: 1) that Falso “appeared to
have gained or attempted to gain access” to a website containing child
pornography, and 2) that he had an eighteen-year-old conviction involving the
sexual abuse of a minor.141 In order to analyze the sufficiency of evidence
supporting the first element, the Falso court relied on their holdings in Martin
and Coreas.142 Once it was established that the affidavit failed to include the
requisite evidence supplied by the affidavit in Martin, where the Falso court had
137. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 2010).
138. Id.
139. Id. The court in Colbert rejected this conclusion as it was “in tension both with common
experience and a fluid, non-technical conception of probable cause. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 230–32 (1983)).
140. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 177–224 (2d Cir. 2008).
141. Id. at 113–14.
142. Id. at 116–21.
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ruled that probable cause could be established, the court concluded that the first
prong of its analysis failed to lend support to the assertion that there was a
substantial likelihood that Falso possessed child pornography in his dwelling.143
The Second Circuit continued, stating “[t]he most obvious other factor that
might support a finding of probable cause is Falso’s eighteen-year-old
misdemeanor.”144 Subsequently the court dived into an analysis of how this
factor would, if at all, contribute to probable cause to search. Falso held that the
district court’s decision to rule Falso’s eighteen-year-old conviction as “highly
relevant” in the probable cause analysis was improper, as shown by their reliance
on Judge Pooler’s example of the “inferential fallacy of ancient standing[.]”145
However, this does not in turn justify the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that it
considered the relationship as wholly irrelevant, since the decision factored in
the recency of the prior act.146 In fact, Falso held that the prior conviction was
only “marginally relevant because the conviction was stale.”147 Falso relies on
the decision in United States v. Ortiz, stating that “two critical factors in
determining whether facts supporting a search warrant are ‘the age of those facts
and the nature of the conduct alleged to have violated the law.”148 In considering
these two factors, the Falso court ultimately decided they “undermined the
probity of Falso’s prior conviction.”149
In support of the conclusion that the recency of the prior sexual abuse results
in it being only marginally relevant, the Falso court contrasted the facts from
those in United States v. Irving, another case from the Second Circuit where
evidence of attempted sexual abuse of a minor was considered when denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress.150 In Irving, the defendant had a prior
conviction of attempted sexual abuse of a minor, dating back more than twenty
years.151 However, unlike in Falso, the court in Irving found the conviction to
be highly relevant based on evidence within the affidavit that the defendant had
sexually abused three children in Mexico just five years before the search of his
apartment, as well as two-year-old letters that had been written by the defendant
discussing his desire to sexually exploit children.152 Of the evidence contained
within the twenty-six page affidavit compiled in Falso, nothing “bridg[es] the

143. Id. at 121; United States v. Martin, 426 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2005).
144. Falso, 544 F.3d at 121.
145. Id. at 122; Martin, 426 F.3d at 82 (Pooler J., dissenting).
146. Falso, 544 F.3d at 122–23.
147. Id. at 122.
148. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Ortiz,
143 F.3d 728, 732 (2d Cir. 1998)).
149. Falso, 544 F.3d at 122.
150. Id. at 123; United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 124–25 (2d Cir. 2006).
151. Irving, 452 F.3d at 116.
152. Id.
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temporal gap between Falso’s eighteen-year-old sex offense and the suspected
child pornography offense.”153
The Falso court was able to soundly conclude that little weight should be
given to this fact when factoring it into their probable cause analysis because his
prior conviction was stale.154 Having established that both the Second Circuit
and the Eighth Circuit considered the relevancy of prior acts of child sex abuse
when conducting their respective probable cause analyses, it is evident that the
level of weight allotted in considering probable cause depends on the recency of
the claimed act. Unlike Falso, the court in Colbert placed greater emphasis on
the evidence of his attempted enticement of the five-year old girl when
reviewing the lower court’s denial of his motion to suppress based on
insufficient probable cause due to it happening hours before a search of his home
occurred.155 The weight of these facts, being dependent upon the recency of the
actions is in line with our modern understanding of the probable cause standard
as the court is required to consider those acts among “the totality of the
circumstances.”156 Thus, these courts and those in their sister circuits should
continue to consider the recency of evidence of prior sexual abuse when
determining if an affidavit provides probable cause for crimes involving the
possession of child pornography.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1995, during a Congressional hearing regarding the CPPA, Senator Orrin
Hatch warned that child pornography was a “plague upon our people.”157 Now,
more than twenty years later those words remain true. In this comment I have
focused on the challenges presented when prosecuting offenders who possess
child pornography. Among many factors, some courts have questioned the
probative value of an offender’s history of prior sexual abuse when conducting
an analysis of probable cause for possession of child pornography.158 This
uncertainty was exacerbated by the Eighth Circuit’s assertion in Colbert, stating
that the court in Falso found evidence of sexual abuse irrelevant to their decision
that there was an insufficient basis to conclude that probable cause existed for
child pornography being located at the defendant’s home.159 By thoroughly
reviewing Falso and prior decisions made by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, I assert that the Eighth Circuit was incorrect in making that statement,
since the Second Circuit did in fact consider this evidence, but found
153. Falso, 544 F.3d at 123.
154. Id.
155. United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578–79 (8th Cir. 2010).
156. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983).
157. Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 233–34
(2001). See also 141 Cong. Rec. S. 24,871 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch regarding Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1995).
158. United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2008).
159. Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578.
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determinative in its analysis the recency of the act to the application for a
warrant.160 Since this analysis was in line with our current understanding of the
probable cause standard, other courts should disregard the discrediting of Falso
stated in Colbert.

160. Falso, 544 F.3d at 122–23.
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